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GUARANTEED RIGHT OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO
AGENCY DOCUMENTS:
CAPITAL CITIES MEDIA, INC.
v. CHESTER,
797 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1986)
Public access to information concerning the functioning of govern-
ment promotes the American ideal of self-government.' The framers
of the Constitution designed the first amendment' to facilitate the free
flow of information upon which individuals may make reasoned judg-
ments.3 While the Supreme Court recognizes a right to receive,4 dis-
1. The Supreme Court on several occasions recognized the role of an informed pub-
lic in the democratic system of government. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (public scrutiny of criminal trials permits the public to partici-
pate in and serve as a check on the judicial process); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring) (free communication has a
structural role to play in securing and fostering self-government); Houchins v. KQED,
438 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (the United States' system of self-
government assumes the existence of an informed electorate, thus courts must protect
access to information).
See H. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW, 128-32 (1953); Emerson, Legal
Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 14; Ivester, The Constitutional
Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109, 115 (1977).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I states in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
3. See Ivester, supra note I at 122-23, n.65, citing The Complete Madison 337 (S.
Padover ed. 1953); 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) (let-
ter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822). James Madison, author of the
first amendment, believed that: "a popular government, without popular information,
or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or tragedy; or perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own
governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives."). See also A.
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT 26-27 (1948)
("The principle of the freedom of speech arises from the necessities of the program of
self government. . . . It is a deduction from the basic American agreement that basic
issues shall be decided by universal suffrage.").
4. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (personal correspondence);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to possess obscene materials in one's
home); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (political material); Gris-
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seminate,5 and gather information,6 the Court permits access to
government-held information only in the context of judicial proceed-
ings.7 In Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester' the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit determined that the first amendment guarantees
access to a public agency's documents.9 The party seeking the docu-
ments must prove that the agency traditionally allowed public access,
and that one of the agency's positive functions is providing access.10
In Capital Cities Pennsylvania's Department of Environmental Re-
sources (DER) denied the Wilkes-Barre Times Leader 11 access to cer-
tain documents under DER control.2 While investigating the causes
of contamination of northeast Pennsylvania's public drinking water
supply,13 the Times Leader sought information about the DER's possi-
ble culpability and enforcement strategy. 14 The Times Leader charged
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to receive information about birth con-
trol); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (religious material).
5. See, e.g., Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial advertisements); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v.
Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (newspapers); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367 (1969) (radio); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (magazines).
6. See Bransburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972) (acknowledging that the first
amendment protects news gathering).
7. See infra notes 32-55 and accompanying text.
8. 797 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1986).
9. Id. at 1166-67.
10. Id. at 1175-76.
11. Capital Cities Media owns the Wilkes-Barre Times Leader.
12. 797 F.2d at 1166. In response to the Times Leader's written request for access
to certain documents, DER supplied a substantial amount of material. Id. The DER,
however, informed the Times Leader that in accordance with DER policy it withheld
certain interoffice memoranda, documents relating to attorney/client communications,
and citizen complaints. Id. DER policy provided that all citizens shall be provided
access to departmental records and documents. Exceptions to this policy are: I) re-
ports or communications, the publication of which would disclose the progress or result
of an investigation undertaken by the agency; 2) any item restricted or prohibited by
statute, or which would impair a person's reputation; 3) any item which would result in
the loss by the state of federal funds. Id.
13. Id. at 1165. In December, 1983, Pennsylvania Gas and Water Co., a major
supplier of drinking water, placed 250,000 customers on water use restrictions. Giardia
cysts contaminated the water, causing an outbreak of an internal illness known as
giardiasis. Id.
14. Id. The Times Leader published approximately four hundred articles dealing
with this incident. Approximately eighty articles focused on DER and raised questions
as to whether DER selectively enforced its mandate to protect the environment. Id
Other articles examined DER's enforcement strategy with regard to sewage discharge
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that the DER's denial of access violated the first amendment and the
state law "right to know."'" A federal district court in Pennsylvania
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under the first
amendment.16 The Times Leader appealed to the Third Circuit, con-
tending that the denial of access to a public agency's official records
abridged the public's historic first amendment right to information to
evaluate the government's effectiveness.17
The public's right of access to information regarding the functioning
of government emerged as an important issue at the Constitutional
Convention. 8 The delegates recognized, however, that courts and leg-
islatures must balance the public's right to know against the need for
informed, efficient decisionmaking.19 Similarly, the first amendment's
historical background reveals a fundamental purpose to promote the
problems in two townships identified as the probable sources of the giardia cyst contam-
ination. Id. at 1165-66.
15. Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 609 F. Supp. 494 (D. Pa. 1985). Capital
Cities invoked pendent jurisdiction to allege state causes of action arising under PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1 (Purdon 1959). Id. at 495. Capital Cities also asserted a
fourteenth amendent challenge, claiming that the department's practices with respect to
the production and withholding of its records deprived the Times Leader of equal pro-
tection of the law. Id.
16. Id. at 497. Capital Cities alleged that the documents sought were official DER
records subject to public inspection and that DER's denial of access to these records
violated the first amendment. The district court held that Capital Cities' conclusory
allegations failed to state a first amendment violation. Id. The court further held that
under Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), the elev-
enth amendment barred the court from considering the state law basis for Times
Leader's claim of access. Id. at 498.
17. Capital Cities Media v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1165 (3d Cir. 1986).
18. See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 170 (Elliot ed. 1974) (the debates addressed
public's right to know regarding the publication of congressional proceedings, focusing
on the proposed provision "[t]hat each house shall keep a journal. . . and shall publish
the same from time to time; except such part. . . as may be judged by that house to
require secrecy."). See also O'BRIEN, THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW 38 (1981) (a
majority of the delegates agreed that the public's right to know the legislature's actions
requires constitutional protection because the delegates adopted art. I, § 5, cl. 3, which
provides: "each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy...").
19. See O'Brien, The First Amendment and the Public's Right to Know, 7 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 579, 595 (1980). The delegates agreed that withholding information con-
cerning foreign negotiations, treaties and military operations, and occasionally informa-
tion relating to domestic governance from the public was both necessary and legitimate.
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exchange of ideas and free flow of information2" to the public without
prior restraint.2"
Courts failed to recognize a constitutional right of access to govern-
ment-held information until the 1970's.22 Early common law denied
citizens a right to inspect public records and documents.2" Eventually,
a rule evolved in England allowing individuals to inspect public docu-
ments that furnished evidence or information necessary to maintain or
defend litigation.2 4 After this rule's application in the United States,
2 5
state courts26 and legislatures2 7 expanded the rule.
Through the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (FOIA),21 Con-
gress took a major step to effectuate the public's right to know.2 9
FOIA's legislative history indicates Congress' concern that restricting
the flow of information endangered the democratic system of govern-
20. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
21. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). See also Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
The constitutional guarantee of a free press assures the maintenance of our political
system and open society . . . and secures the paramount public interest in a free
flow of information to the public. . . . [A]ny system of prior restraints comes to
this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.
417 U.S. at 832.
22. See Gannet v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1978) (no sixth amendment right for
press or public to attend criminal trials); Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1977) (no
constitutionally mandated right of access to any government-held information); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) and Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (no
constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates).
23. See H. CRoss, supra note 1, at 25.
24. Id. The English courts began to recognize the right of inspection for use in
providing for prospective litigation and enforced it either by a simple order or by writ of
mandamus. Id.
25. Id. at 26.
26. Id. at 27. Courts began to depart from the rule allowing for access only with
respect to litigation. A New Jersey court issued mandamus to compel access to letters
of recommendation of applicants for municipal licenses for the sale of ale, basing issu-
ance on the citizen's common interest in the enforcement of laws and ordinances of his
or her community. State ex rel Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332 (1879). A Vermont
court allowed access by a citizen seeking inspection of bills on file with the state audi-
tor's office, stating that permitting access may result in reforms. Access was thus a
matter of right. Clement v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290 (1906).
27. Capital Cities Media, 797 F.2d at 1170. More than half of the states enacted
right to know laws. Id. at 1171. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 66.1, 66.2 (Purdon
1959).
28. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
29. Ivester, supra note 1, at 143.
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ment.3 ° Through the FOIA, Congress intended to insure maximum
public disclosure of information held by various government
agencies.
31
The Supreme Court only recently recognized a constitutional right
of access to government-held information.32 In Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia,3" the Court held that the right to attend criminal trials
is implicit in the first amendment. 34 The newspaper appealed from the
trial judge's closure order, granted in response to the defendant's con-
cern that press and public attendance would prejudice jurors.3 5
Although it granted the newspaper the right of access under the first
amendment, 6 the Court noted that the right is not absolute.3 7
In Globe Newspapers v. Superior Courta' the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the public's right of access.39 Holding that a state statute man-
30. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2418, 2429.
A democratic society requires an informed intelligent electorate, and the intelli-
gence of the electorate varies as the quality and quantity of its information varies.
A danger signal to our democratic society in the U.S. is the fact that such a polit-
ical truism needs repeating. . . . [T]he ideals of our democratic society have out-
paced the machinery which makes that society work. The needs of the electorate
have outpaced the laws which guarantee public access to the facts in Government.
Id.
31. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982) provides, however, for nine exemptions encompassing
(1) national security matters, (2) internal personnel rules and practices, (3) statutory
exemptions, (4) trade secrets, (5) inter-agency and intra-agency memoranda, (6) matters
of personal privacy, (7) investigatory files, (8) financial institution records, and (9) geo-
logical information concerning wells. Section 552(b) does not mandate withholding in-
formation. Rather, government, in exercise of its discretion, may release documents
falling within one of the categorical exemptions. See Associated Dry Goods Corp. v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 419 F. Supp. 814, 821 (E.D. Va. 1976).
32. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1979). But see Gannet v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1978), where the Court considered the right of public and
press access to criminal proceedings. Id. at 391-92.
33. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
34. Id. at 580.
35. Id. at 560. At the time the trial judge granted closure, no other party set forth
any objections. Id. at 560.
36. Id. at 575. "[I]n the context of trials, the [flirst [a]mendment guarantees of
speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing court-
room doors which had long been open to the public at the time that [a]mendment was
adopted." Id. at 576.
37. Id. at 581. The Court suggests that situations exist in which denial of access
may be justified. Id. at 581-82, n.18.
38. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
39. Id. at 610-11.
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dating closure of trials imposed an excessive restriction,4" the Court
offered two reasons for first amendment protection of public right of
access to criminal trials.41 First, criminal trials historically have been
open to the general public.42 Second, the right of access to criminal
trials plays a significant role in the functioning of the judicial process
and the government as a whole.43 The Court stated that to deny ac-
cess, the state must have a compelling interest and the denial must be
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.44
The Court expanded the public's right of access to voir dire in crimi-
nal trials in Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 1).45
The Court applied the Globe46 reasoning, holding that juror selection
historically was open to the public, and that openness is a valuable part
of jury selection. a7 Thus, courts can deny access to voir dire only when
a party proves an overriding interest and that the denial of judicial
access is narrowly tailored to serve the significant interest.48 The
Court, however, recognized some limits on the right of access.49
In Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 11)50 the
40. Id. at 610.
41. Id. at 605. The opinions in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(1980), emphasize these considerations.
42. Id. at 605. The Court viewed a tradition of openness as significant in constitu-
tional terms because the Constitution carries the gloss of history and because "a tradi-
tion of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience." Id. (quoting Justice
Brennan's concurrence in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589
(1980)).
43. Id. at 606. The Court viewed public access to criminal trials as providing a
check on the judicial process and fostering an appearance of fairness. Id.
44. Id. at 607. Courts limit the circumstances under which access to criminal trials
can be denied, and courts strictly scrutinize whether denial of access is justified. Id. at
606.
45. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
46. Globe Newspapers v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
47. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 505-10 (1984). In surveying
the history of jury selection, the Court found that public juror selection was the com-
mon practice in the United States at the time of the Constitution's adoption. Id. at 508.
Openness enhances the basic fairness of the trial as well as public confidence in the
judicial system. Id.
48. Id. The Court emphasizes that a party must articulate the interests protected by
denial of access along with findings so specific that a reviewing court can determine
whether access was properly denied.
49. Id. at 510. The right of access is rebuttable. Id.
50. 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986).
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Court extended the right of access to preliminary criminal hearings.5
Employing the Globe52 and Press-Enterprise i53 tests, the Court em-
phasized that if a criminal hearing has historically been public and al-
lowing access logically and significantly assists in the proper judicial
function of the hearing, a qualified first amendment right of access at-
taches. 4 Courts may deny access only if specific recorded findings ex-
ist demonstrating that denial of access is essential to preserve higher
values. 55
Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester5 6 is a federal appellate court's
first attempt to determine whether the first amendment guarantees a
right of access to agency documents.5 7 Judge Stapleton, writing for a
divided court,58 applied the Supreme Court's test, most recently articu-
lated in Press-Enterprise II, for determining the right of access to judi-
cial proceedings.5 9 The court decided that Capital Cities successfully
proved that access to DER documentation was necessary to assess the
department's performance, thus satisfying the requirement that access
be valuable to administrative procedure. 6° Nevertheless, the court sus-
tained the lower court's dismissal of the claim because Capital Cities
51. Id. at 2744.
52. Globe Newspapers v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
53. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
54. Press-Enterprise II, 106 S. Ct. at 2741.
55. Id. at 2743. Where the interest, as here, was the right of the accused to a fair
trial, the Court applies a substantial probability test. Id. The Court would deny access
if specific findings demonstrated a substantial probability of prejudice to the defendant's
right to a fair trial, and if reasonable alternatives to closure would inadequately protect
the right to fair trial. Id.
See also Society of Professional Journalists v. Secretary of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569
(D. Utah 1985). Here, the court applied the analysis developed in this line of cases,
holding that a public right of access exists with respect to formal administrative fact
finding hearings. Id. at 573. Noting little historical tradition as to the particular
agency, the court nevertheless held that such a tradition existed based on analogy to the
openness of civil trials. Id. at 575.
56. 797 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1986).
57. See supra notes 32-55 and accompanying text.
58. The court divided 7-5. Circuit Judge Adams concurred, writing a separate
opinion. Circuit Judge Higginbotham,, joined by Circuit Judges Sloviter and
Mansmann, dissented. Circuit Judge Garth also dissented.
59. Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d at 1175. The court interpreted
the test to require a party arguing a first amendment right of access to government
information must allege and prove a tradition of public access and that the value of
access is significant to the proceeding to which access is sought. Id.
60. Id.
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failed to allege the existence of an historical tradition of access to
agency-held documents.6 '
In attempting to find a right of access to agency-held documents, 62
the court concluded that the founding fathers intended affirmative
rights of access not explicitly conferred by the Constitution to depend
on political processes for protection.63 The court emphasized that the
Supreme Court never recognized an absolute first amendment right of
public access." The court reasoned that a right of access guaranteed
by the first amendment would require courts to balance the competing
interests, thus effectively legislating categories of exclusions.65
The dissent attacked the majority's holding as creating an unprece-
dented pleading barrier for parties seeking access to agency-held docu-
ments.66 The dissent viewed the first amendment as restricting
governmental abuse of power, creating individual rights, and imposing
governmental duties.67 Arguing that the majority misinterpreted the
Supreme Court's holdings from Richmond through Press-Enterprise
11,68 the dissent asserted that none of those decisions imposed a plead-
61. Id. at 1176. The court interpreted "tradition of access" to apply to agencies
generally. Id. at 1175. Under this pleading requirement, Capital Cities' claim that the
DER denied the Times Leader access to official documents of the public agency could
not stand,
62. Id. at 1167-74. The court surveyed the history of the right of public access,
maintaining that "it requires some straining of the text [of the first amendment] to con-
strue the amendment. . . [as] conferring upon each citizen a presumptive right of ac-
cess to any government-held information." Id. at 1168.
63. Id. at 1167.
64. Id. at 1171. The court primarily bases its conclusion on Houchins v. KQED,
438 U.S. 1 (1979). See supra note 18. Although Houchins has not been overruled, the
Supreme Court recently demonstrated a willingness to search for a presumption in favor
of access. See supra notes 28-51 and accompanying text.
65. 797 F.2d at 1172. The court essentially stated that a balancing test would be too
cumbersome, because the court must consider the value of each document against the
asserted governmental interest. Id.
66. Id. at 1190 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). In effect, the dissent accused the majority
of being uncomfortable with the first amendment purpose of informing the electorate,
thereby evading its duty to examine the restraint and determine whether it is narrowly
tailored to the identified government interest.
67. Id. at 1184-85. The dissent appears to adopt Emerson's position that the right
to know focuses on the affirmative aspects of the first amendment. See Emerson, supra
note 1. Emerson maintains that the most significant and beneficial aspect of the right to
know lies in its potential role in increasing the amount of information available to the
public from the government. Id. at 2.
68. Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d at 1190. The dissent disagrees
with the majority regarding the significance of a tradition of openness. Id. The lan-
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ing requirement. 69 Rather, the dissent viewed these cases as holding
only that courts may sustain a denial of access if the denial demonstra-
bly advances significant governmental interests and is narrowly tai-
lored to serve those interests.7" Finally, the dissent argued that if the
court requires the claimant to demonstrate a tradition of access, the
Pennsylvania right to know statute71 is sufficient evidence of this
tradition.72
The Third Circuit's reasoning in Capital Cities 73 is inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's approach in Richmond through Press-Enterprise
I. 71 In applying the test articulated in the Richmond line of cases, the
Supreme Court demonstrated a willingness to find a tradition of open-
ness. 75 The Capital Cities court, however, struck a middle ground and
neither recognized nor denied the existence of a tradition of access.76
The Third Circuit refused to read the Supreme Court's decisions as
mandating an expansion of first amendment protection.77 Rather, in
relying on an earlier assertion by the Court that no general right of
access to government-held information exists,78 the Third Circuit deni-
grated the Supreme Court's recognition of a right of access.79 The
guage relied on by the majority "applies only to access to various stages of the judicial
process rather than to records of the executive or legislative branches." Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1 (Purdon 1959). The Pennsylvania right to know
statute is consistent with the federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1982). See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. While both statutes exempt cer-
tain categories of documents, neither mandate that such documents must always be
withheld. Rather, the administrator is granted discretion to withhold documents.
72. 797 F.2d at 1191. The dissent argued that legislative promulgation of "right to
know" acts does not minimize a first amendment protection of that right. Id.
73. 797 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1986).
74. See supra notes 32-55 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 64.
76. 797 F.2d at 1175. The court implied, however, that such a tradition could not
be found. Id. Nevertheless, the court's holding only extended to the pleading standard.
Id. at 1176.
77. Id. at 1189. The court characterized these decisions as holding no more than
that the government may not close government proceedings which historically have
been open. Id. at 1173.
78. Id. at 1173. The court ruled on the Houchins case. See supra notes 22, 64 and
accompanying text. The Third Circuit emphasized that the Richmond line of decisions
did not overrule Houchins. Id.
79. See supra note 77. This author agrees with the dissent that a better interpreta-
tion of the decisions would be that they hold that arbitrary restraints on access to infor-
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Capital Cities court, heavily emphasizing the test's tradition of access
component, misread the Supreme Court's decisions as placing the bur-
den of proving a tradition of access on the party seeking access.
80
The Third Circuit further implied that there must be a tradition of
access traceable to colonial times.8' Because courts apply the Supreme
Court's test to the particular type of government proceeding, the Third
Circuit's reasoning requires parties in Capital Cities' position to prove
that agency documents were generally available during the colonial pe-
riod.8" Proving a tradition of access is virtually impossible because few
governmental agencies existed at that time.83
By construing the Supreme Court's decisions as establishing a plead-
ing requirement, the Third Circuit avoided recognizing a constitutional
right of access to agency-held documents. The court's Capital Cities
approach indicates that parties desiring access to agency-held docu-
ments must seek legislative assistance to further enlarge the scope of
that access.84
Barbara Greenberg
mation abridge the freedoms protected by the first amendment. 797 F.2d at 1188.
Courts should treat barriers to access as prior restraints. Id. at 1190.
80. See supra note 66. The dissent argued that the majority contravened traditional
first amendment analysis by placing the pleading burden on the Times Leader.
81. 797 F.2d at 1173. The court emphasized that the Supreme Court traced the
history of judicial proceedings to colonial times to determine whether a tradition of
openness existed.
82. Id. at 1175.
83. Id. at 1190. The dissent correctly noted that strictly holding to the requirement
that access existed in colonial times would ignore the enormous growth in governmental
activity in the past two hundred years, and would contradict the idea that the framers
designed the Constitution to accommodate an expanding government. Id. at 1190, n. 12.
84. Id. at 1170-71. The court endorsed the view that decisions as to the type and
amount of information disclosed are political. Id. at 1171.
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